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SCHROED-R V. GOHDE
SCHROEDER v. GOHDE
The recent case of Shroeder v. Gohde, 123 Minn. 459, seems
to be decided correctly according to the statutes in existence
in Minnesota, but the decision and particularly the annota-
tion appended to the report of the case in 6 A. L. R. 571
obviously are misleading, inasmuch as they state as an un-
qualified proposition of law that which must be dependent on
the statutory provisions of each State.
The case has to do with the rights of creditors in funds
resulting from the sale of homestead property. The facts
were these: About 1890, Henry C. Gohde bought 80 acres of
land with money furnished by his wife, Louise. She believed
the deed was made to her, and did not learn that it was made
to her husband until long afterwards. In 1910, the defendants,
Henry C. and Louise Gohde, contracted to sell the land to
one Morell. To secure the consent of Louise to the bargain,
defendant Henry agreed that all the proceeds should be paid
to her. This action is by the creditors of Henry to subject
the proceeds of the sale to the payment of an unsatisfied
judgment. The Court held that the agreement that Louise
should receive the proceeds of the sale was valid, and that the
transaction was not fraudulent as to the creditors of Henry.
"The controlling fact in such a case," said the Court, "is that
creditors are no worse off than they were before. They had
no claim upon the homestead property, and the agreement
which these parties made was of no concern to them. ' Credit-
ors have no right to complain of the dealings with property
which the law does not allow them to apply on their claims.'
Anderson v. Odell, 51 Mich. 492." No reference is made to
any Minnesota statute as controlling the decision, but on the
contrary, we are likely to be led to believe that the rule laid
down that such transactions are not fraudulent as to creditors
is one that is applicable to all like cases.
It seems, however, that the Minnesota statutes did control
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the decision. Section 5676 of the General Statutes of Minne-
sota (1893) provides that: "The homestead of the deceased
* * * shall descend free from any testamentary devise
W * and free from all debts or claims upon the estato
of the deceased, as follows: (1) If there be no child nor law-
ful issue of any deceased child living, to the surviving husband
or wife. (2) If there be a child or the issue of any deceased
child living, and a surviving husband or wife, to such husband
or wife during the term of his or her natural life, remainder
to the child or children and the issue of any deceased child
by right of representation. 1 1 * " Since by express
statutory enactment the homestead in Minnesota descends
free from all debts against the estate of the deceased, it may
be properly said that the creditors "had no claim upon the
homestead property and the agreement which these parties
made (as to the disposal of the land and its proceeds) was
of no concern to them." But we might have wished that
the Court had placed the decision upon the ground of the
statute instead of Iayin- down the bare statement that such
agreements are valid and not fraudulent as to creditors.
The annotation to Schroeder v. Gohde, as reported in 6
A. L. R. 571, is more misleading. The author advances as the
rule the bald statement that "an agreement between the hus-
band and wife that the wife shall receive the proceeds of a
sale of home--tead property, in consideration of her joinder
in a conveyance thereof is not fraudulent as to creditors of
the husband," and he then proceeds to a discussion of ca.es
fiom California, Iowa. Missouri, 01dahoma, Texas, and Ver-
mont as sustaining the proposition.' He seems, however. to
have lost sight of the fact that whether such disposition of the
proceeds of the sale of the homestead as in Schroeder v.
Gohde is fraudulent or not as to creditors may depend upon
the character of the homestead and the rights of creditors
1. Tho e-ses n1iscuss-d are: Wetherlv v. Straus. 93 Cal. 283; Offleor v.
Evans. 48 Iowa 557; Jones v. BrPndt. F9 Iowa 332; Stinle v. Behrens,
91 Mo. 25d: Ye-. hw v. W1lIev. 22 Okla. 677: Blum v. Light, 81 Tex.
414; Allen v Hall. I Tex. Ann. Civ. Cases (White & W.) 755; Gatewood v.
Scurlock, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 98; Keyes v. Rines, 37 Vt. 260.
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therein as defined by the statutes of the different states, for
he cites cases where the creditors have no right in the home-
stead and therefore cannot complain of the manner of its dis-
position. It is difficult to see why in States where the home-
stead is a mere present right of exemption from attachment
and sale under execution and the homestead does not descend
free from claims against the estate of the deceased, a convey-
ance of the fee would not deprive the creditor of a right to
have the residue left after the termination of the exemption-
the so-called "reversionary interest"-applied to the liquida-
tion of his claims and thus defraud him of his right to proceed
against the reversion.
It is well settled that under certain statutes the homestead
right is a mere exemption and does not vest the person
entitled thereto with an absolute estate in fee in the homestead
property. In Carrigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185, the Court in
construing Sections 2943 of the Code of Tennessee (Milliken
& Vertrees) said, "The homestead is a mere right of occu-
pancy, and the remainder or reversion therein may be sold,
subject to the homestead." In Hanby's Adm'r v. Henritze's
Adm'r, 85 Va. 177, the Court under the Code of 1873, Sec-
tion 8, Ch. 183, held that after the expiration of the exemption,
the homestead may be subjected by creditors. Under the
authority of Art. 10, Section 3, of the Constitution of the
State of Alabama, the Court in Miller v. Marx, 55 Ala. 322,
held that the widow took no title to the premises, and that
the property reverted to the estate whenever the exemption
ceased. A similar conclusion was reached in Evans v. Evans,
13 Bush, 587.
The difference between the fee simple homestead and the
mere exemption right of homestead, and the consequent differ-
ence in the rights of creditors with respect thereto, a distinc-
tion that the author of the A. L. R. annotation seems to have
failed to grasp, is brought out JiR the case of Shaeffer v. Belds-
meier, 107 Mo. 314: "Under former statutory provisions relat-
ing to homesteads, the land covered by a homestead was wholly
exempt from all liability for debt, exempt from attachment and
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execution. The hmsband took a fee-simple which passed to
his widow and minor heirs. This being the case, it was prop-
erly ruled that such a thing as a fraudulent conveyance of
a homestead could not exist. * * * But a radical change
occurred in the homestead act by reason of the amendment
of 1875. R. S. 1889, Sec. 5439. The fee no longer passes to
the original occupant, nor, on his decease, to his widow and
heirs; but an estate limited to the death of the widow and
the attainment of the majority of the youngest child. * * 1
To the extent of whatever interest then the decedent had in
the land over and above a homestead estate, as distinguished
from a fee-simple estate, to that extent his conveyance, if
fraudulent, would be void as against * * * an existing
creditor, and the latter would be entitled to set aside such
conveyance by appropriate proceedings and to have such
reversionary interest applied to the satisfaction of his judg-
ment lien."
It is quite evident, then, that the rule laid down without
qualification in Schroeder v. Gohde and in the annotation of
the case in 6 A. L. R. is stated too broadly, inasmuch as the
conclusions reached therein must depend entirely upon the
character of the homestead right. If such right is a mere
exemption of the property from direct liability for debts dur-
ing the life or minority of the parties for whose benefits the
homestead is instituted, and the reversionary estate is still
liable for the debts of the head of the family, clearly the
rule that such a transaction as occurred here would not be
fraudulent does not apply, for the creditor would be deprived
of the right to look to the reversion for the satisfaction of his
claims. As both the report of the case and the annotation
thereof are likely to mislead one to assume that an agreement
between the husband and wife that the wife shall receive the
proceeds of a sale of homestead property, in consideration
of her joinder in a conveyance thereof would not be fraudulent
as to the creditors of the husband in any jurisdiction, it seems
that such report and annotation should not be allowed to go
unchallenged. JAMES THORNTON DOLAN, '22.
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